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0.1 Abstract
In this work, we extend previous work done on removing anonymity from The
Onion Routing network (Tor). We explore previous techniques for removing Tor’s
anonymity developed on a private Tor network, and attempt to reproduce these
results on the global public network.
We find that the previous work done on the private network is unable to
be carried over to the public network. This is mainly due to the level of jitter
on the public network overwhelming our earlier method for compromising Tor’s
anonymity. We develop a new method for compromising Tor’s anonymity by using
a clustering algorithm to analyze the data that we gathered via a side channel
timing attack. This neural network finds data clusters that can be recognized
despite the jitter in the global network. We then used use the recognizable timing
patterns to build Hidden Markov models(HMM). Using these models we are able
to recognize network traffic patterns and reduce Tor’s anonymity.
We establish how well multiple paths through Tor prevents our side channel
attack. Because the paths don’t contain the same nodes, the packet delays are
different. This successfully counters our side channel attack and restores Tor
anonymity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As the world becomes more connected through the Internet, we have become used
to all of the advantages that this provides. People are now constantly sending and
receiving messages and data through their cell phones and computers, and the
amount of information available on individuals has never been higher. This means
that there is an increasing number of individuals, companies, and even nations
monitoring and observing all this data. Because of this, many users feel the need
to anonymize themselves on the Internet. These users can be anyone from private
individuals to government agents, but all have the same goal of keeping their
actions on the net private. Examples of these individuals would be Iranian and
Tibetan dissidents attempting to speak out against their governments. Members
of the Arab Spring also relied on anonymous networks to disperse information and
avoid detection by the Libyan and Egyptian regimes.
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1.1 Anonymous Communication
The goal of anonymizing systems is to hide and obfuscate direct communication
between source and destination. The primary example is a simple proxy. In a
proxy, the source will never directly communicate with the destination. Proxying
reduces the information attackers can gain by analyzing the header information
of packets; because it will never contain both the true source and destination. In
addition to using proxy nodes, there are several other methods that can be used
to anonymize users. These methods include:
• Mixing packet flows
• Controlling packet flow rates
• Sending dummy traffic
• Setting packets to a fix length
Mixing the packet flows, refers to changing the order that the packets are
transmitted. This helps reduce the amount of analysis that can be done on the
time delays of the packets. Batching is another method to reduce the information
that can be gained by observing time delays. In it, one controls the flow rate of
packets so that messages are grouped together, rather then each packet being sent
individually.
Networks are classified as high or low latency, depending on the anonymizing
practices they use.
High-latency networks generally have strong mixing, batching, and reordering
algorithms. These reduce the information that can be used to analyze the traffic,
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but comes at the cost of large time delays. This means that these networks are
not suited for interactive communication, despite their high level of protection.
Low-latency networks typically don’t implement as many anonymization tech-
niques as high-latency, however they are fast enough for interactive communi-
cation. A example of low-latency networks is Tor, which is the most popular
low-latency.
1.2 Traffic Analysis
There once was a time when one could view information sent via unencrypted
channels and read what it said. Encryption has become far more common in
network communication. Starting in 1995, users were introduced to SSH and SSL.
Using the encryption methods these two programs provided, it became harder for
attackers to view the actual information in a packet. In 2002, Tor took things
a step further [10]. In Tor, every packet within the Tor network is encrypted.
Because the packet travels through multiple nodes in the network, no one packet
contains both the source and destination in its address information. Attackers
must become more creative in how they analyze the data.
Because each individual packet in Tor is encrypted, the attacker cannot read
communications between users of the network. However, they are still able to
analyze the data via information that isn’t be encrypted. Reading the packet
headers, as well as monitoring packet lengths and the timing between packets can
allow the attacker to still make assumptions about the network. By combining
these bits of information over a long period of time, the attacker can still learn
valuable information about the users. For example, the attacker can discover
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things like [6]:
• Which users are talking to each other
• Where the users are located
• The time and pattern of the users communications
• The applications and protocols that the user uses
• The amount of data being communicated
While the attacker may not be able to know all of the exact details of the user,
they can get a decent idea based on the information above. As such, the attacker
can still remove a user’s anonymity and monitor them, even without cracking the
encryption on the data. Attacks that are carried out using this information are
referred to as side channel attacks.
1.3 Research Question
The previous work done on the experimental Tor network showed that it was both
possible to remove [3] as well as increase [1] the anonymity that Tor provides.
However neither the attack or the defensive measure were ever tested on the global
Tor network during the previous research.
We expose the hypothesis that one can model the Tor data and successfully
carry out a side channel timing attack against it. We also find that using multiple
paths through Tor removes the side-channel vulnerability.
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1.4 Organization
As users begin to rely more on the Internet for communication and exchanging
information, it becomes important to ensure anonymity and security when using
the Internet. The research presented explores the hypothesis that previous work
attacking anonymity using a experimental Tor network can be extended to the
global network.
Chapter 2 discusses the background material needed to understand the work
being done on Tor. The nature and working of Tor is explained, as well as ex-
amples of Tor’s strengths and weaknesses. The CSSR algorithm is explained and
demonstrated to show how we create the HMMs needed for our work.
Chapter 3 discusses the results of replicating Chris Abbott and Ryan Craven’s
work on Tor. We recreate their tests on the global network and see how well
the results from their private network tests match those gained from the global
network. Then after discussing the flaw in the global network results, we propose
a solution using neural networks to analyze the data and remove some of the
noise. Using this method, recreate both Ryan Craven’s attack and Chris Abbott’s
defense on the global Tor network.
Chapter 4 contains the summary of the results and suggest topics for further
research.
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Chapter 2
Background
Tor is one of the most popular anonymous communication networks. It is used to
ensure anonymous and private web browsing. Because it is fast enough to be used
by a web browser, it is also fast enough to be vulnerable to timing attacks. The
focus of this research is test the vulnerability of the global Tor network to timing
side channel attacks and find ways to prevent these attacks.
2.1 Tor
Tor is an anonymity system that acts as a overlay network on the Internet. Overlay
networks are networks that exist as sub-networks on top of a larger preexisting net-
work. Examples of overlay networks include Virtual Private Networks and peer to
peer networks. In both cases, individuals communicate through the overlay using
virtual links. This means traffic is physically transmitted through the underlying
network, but encapsulation keeps it separate from normal traffic.
Tor users connect to and use the network via the Internet. Data sent through
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Tor is encapsulated so as to keep it separate from normal Internet traffic between
the computers, as well as to provide greater encryption. As such, the Internet
itself acts as the preexisting network, while the Tor relays make up the overlay
network.
Tor is comprised of several different kinds of nodes. These are Entry, Exit, and
Relay nodes, which handle most of the common routing. There are also directory
servers which make public all of the connected nodes. In areas where Tor is blocked
or censored, there are Bridge relays. These relays are Tor nodes not made public
by the directory servers. They exist to allow users to still use Tor and get around
ISPs that are filtering their connection. These bridge relays remain hidden via the
obfsproxy tool. This tool conceals the traffic between the Tor client and Bridge
relay. This allows the Bridge to remain hidden from outside observers.
However, for the purpose of carrying out our experiments, we only use the
Entry, Exit, and Relay nodes made public by the directory servers.
Figure 2.1: Example of the Tor network
As seen in figure 2.1, users connect to the Tor network through an entry node,
the traffic then travels through several relay nodes, and finally reaches the desti-
nation via the exit node. Tor earns its name though how the data is encapsulated
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with a different layer of encryption for each node it passes through. That means
that to crack the packet while it is in the node, you have to peel back and break
each encryption layer. As such, the visual analogy is like peeling back the layers of
an onion, hence The Onion Router. A more detailed explanation on the workings
of Tor can be seen in the Tor specifications [5].
The advantage of using Tor is that users monitoring your traffic will only see
you connecting to Tor, not who your communicating with on the other side of Tor.
This allows you to be anonymous in your activity on the Internet, because people
monitoring the sites you are on will only see a connection from Tor, with no way
to link it back to your machine.
2.2 OnionCat
OnionCat creates a VPN within Tor [7]. We use it to make a constant address
within Tor that users can send or receive data from. Because this address is
contained within Tor, the user is able to remain anonymous. One can think of it
as an anonymous mailbox. You can send and receive information from it, but no
one knows who you are.
When two users connect to each other via OnionCat, it acts as if connecting
to a server. One user requests the connection, and the other accepts it. It is here
that OnionCat takes advantage of Tor’s hidden service protocol. In the protocol,
users connect to a rendezvous point within Tor. The user of the hidden service
can advertise its location using induction points. These induction points act as
relay nodes that connect the user to the rendezvous point, which then connects to
the host. The result of this is that the user never knows the address of either the
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node running the hidden service, or the host address. At the same time, the host
never knows the address of the user. Thus the name hidden service, because the
address of both sides are hidden from the other.
Because the identity of the users remains hidden, the only way for one Onion-
Cat user to connect to another is if they know the other users onion-URL. This is
Tor’s address for the users hidden service. Groups like news organizations can pub-
lish their onion-URL and allow other people to connect to them and anonymously
submit information.
2.3 Attacks on Tor
As Tor has increased in popularity, it has also caught the attention of many
researchers wanting to test its security and anonymity. This has lead to a constant
cycle where researchers are discovering and testing new vulnerabilities, and then
working to eliminate them or reduce their effectiveness.
The attacks that have been developed for Tor can be divided into two cate-
gories, active and passive. Active attacks involve the attacker directly manipulat-
ing or affecting the network in some way, while passive do not.
2.3.1 Active Attacks
Many of the active attacks developed against Tor were only successful while the
global Tor network was still small. Methods such as flooding one or more routers
with traffic and watching time delays used to work as a means of guessing which
circuit paths entry nodes were connected to [9]. However as the global network
expands and more nodes become added to it, this attack is no longer viable.
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Another attack can be done simply by using applications. Most flash, java
scripts, and even some cookies will bypass Tor and expose the identity of the user.
As such, Tor strongly suggests users disable those features when browsing the web
through Tor.
Hackers have also tried targeting Tor’s directory servers [4]. These servers act
as lists which tell users what entry, relay and exit nodes are running. As such, the
compromising of those servers has dire consequences for users of the network.
2.3.2 Passive Attacks
Passive attacks on Tor primarily consist of side channel attacks. These attacks
use knowledge gained from observing the system to compromise it. The advantage
of side channel attacks is that they allow the attacker to bypass most standard
encryption and security protocols.
In 2005, a side channel attack was developed to thwart the anonymity provided
by mixing networks [11]. These networks act like Tor in nature. The attacker
listens to traffic going through all entry and exit points in the network. That
timing delay information is then cross-correlated, allowing the user to recognize
which entry and exit points are connected. This attack is interested in both how
quickly the attack can be preformed, and that it seems to work better on larger
networks.
An example of a side channel attack used on Tor would be the original method
Ryan Craven developed to compromise Tor [3]. He observed the timing delays of
packets entering and leaving the experimental Tor network. Using that data, he
built Hidden Markov models. He could then match the communication of users
to the models, and make estimations of which user was talking to who. In order
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to make the HMM, he used zero-knowledge HMMs.
2.4 Zero-Knowledge HMM Inference
Zero-knowledge HMM inference works by taking in a string of symbolized data
and splitting it into segments. The length of these segments is chosen by the user.
These segments now represent all of the possible states of the model. To find the
transition probabilities, it simply counts up how often one state leads to the next
in the data. The program that performs these tasks is called CSSR(Casual State
Splitting and Reconstruction).
(a) Raw Data (b) HMM formed
Figure 2.2: Example of HMM made from Tor data
Data Value Symbol
0.288 b
0.572 d
0.649 e
0.722 j
0.887 k
Table 2.1: The alphabet used by CSSR to symbolize data.
Figure 2.2 shows an example of the raw data collected and the HMM that it
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creates. In order to create the model, the program first symbolizes the data using
table 2.1. Using this alphabet to symbolize the data, you replace the data value
with the symbol that most closely matches its value. Thus, every value of 0.288
in the data set gets translated into a b, while every value of 0.57 gets translated
into a d, and so on. In the end, you get a sting of characters that looks like:
b,d,k,k,b,d,k,k,k,k,k, ect. Because the window size is two, the states of the model
look like: bd, kk, dk, ect. The program counts how often states lead to each other,
and those values are estimates of the transition probabilities in the HMM in figure
2.2.
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Chapter 3
Test Results
The testing method for Tor is simple, and a picture of the network can be seen in
Figure 3.1. One sends packets through Tor and records the time delays between
packets. We analyze the data using histograms of the data values. This histogram
data is used to make the alphabet files that CSSR uses to make the HMMs. And
by comparing the HMMs and their outputs, one would know if they were able to
remove the anonymity of Tor. If only it really worked that well.
Figure 3.1: The test network for the global Tor network.
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3.1 Initial Results on the Global Network
As mentioned earlier, both Craven [3] and Abbott’s [1] experimentation used the
experimental Tor network contained in the security lab. This network consists
of only 12 relay nodes, 1 entry node, 1 exit node, and one directory node. It
can be seen in figure 3.2. The global Tor network is larger though. With several
thousand nodes in use at any one time, and stationed all around the world, the
public network has more jitter than the experimental.
Figure 3.2: The test network for the experimental Tor network.
3.1.1 Multiple Paths through Tor
We first tried to replicate Abbott’s work on the global Tor network. As detailed
in his paper, his design was to have multiple paths through the network, so as to
prevent any observer from being able to recognize a user based on the time delays
between packets [1]. The idea is that multiple paths distort the timing data so as
to stop the attacker from recognizing the target. A visual example of the multiple
path strategy can be seen in figure 3.3.
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(a) Example of a single path
circuit
(b) Example of a circuit with
two possible paths
(c) Example of a circuit with
three possible paths
Figure 3.3: Examples of the multiple paths design.
(a) Histogram of the sending data(b) Time delays of the sending
data
Figure 3.4: Time delays and histogram of the sending data.
The tests involved sending packets though Tor and collecting the timing data.
This data was then used to make histograms to be used to compare the data.
Figure 3.4 shows the analysis of the data from the packets right before going
through Tor. Thus the timing delays are the delays between the generation of one
packet after the previous packet.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the timing delays and histograms of three different
tests. In the first test, the packets all traveled through Tor using the same path.
In the second test, the packets randomly chose between 2 different paths. And
in the third test, there were three paths that the packets would randomly choose
from. In all cases, the same sending pattern was used for the packets.
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(a) Delays caused by 1 path (b) Delays caused by 2 paths (c) Delays caused by 3 paths
Figure 3.5: Examples of the time delay difference caused by multiple paths
(a) Histogram of 1 path (b) Histogram of 2 paths (c) Histogram of 3 paths
Figure 3.6: Histograms of the results from the three different path tests.
As one can see by comparing figure 3.4 to 3.6, it’s hard to see a similarity or
make comparisons between the histograms. Even when comparing the histogram
of the single path test, there is little in common with the histogram of the data
before it went through Tor. This case of severe noise can also be seen when looking
at the timing delay results of the three tests. None of them match the pattern of
the sending data, and the two and three path tests are so noisy that there’s no
noticeable difference.
This method also fails to be able to analyze the noise differences between the
different paths in the two and three path tests. In all cases the noise from Tor
overrides any observable results. The result of this is that we are unable to verify
Abbott’s work. This is because Abbott demonstrated the success of his work by
using histograms of the data to show the effects of multiple paths. However, the
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noise of the global Tor network is much grater then that of the private network
that Abbott worked on. Thus that noise overrides his results and prevents us from
confirming his work using his exact method. Because of this, we decided to go
back and retest Craven’s attack. The idea being that if we can find a way to make
Craven’s attack work, then we can find a way to test Abbott’s work on multiple
paths.
3.1.2 Side Channel Timing Attack
Craven looked at inter-packet time delays entering and exiting Tor. By looking at
the inter-packet delay, one can negate concerns about how long the network path
is. He made histograms of the resulting time values, and used the histograms to
make an alphabet file for CSSR. Using HMMs from CSSR, he could attempt to
match user’s data to those models and break their anonymity.
So, to go through the attack we first need a set of training data. Figure 3.7
shows the timing delays of the packets before they go into Tor, as well as the
histogram that data makes. Figure 3.8 shows the data coming out of Tor. As you
can see already, once again the noise of the global network has made the histogram
analysis useless.
We use the histogram data to create a alphabet file for the Hidden Markov
models. Based on the histogram of the packets going into Tor, you can see key
values at 0.3, 0.6, and 0.9 seconds. However the histogram of the data coming out
of Tor shows values of 1, 300, and 450 seconds.
The alphabet files made from these values can be seen in tables 3.1 and 3.2.
The results of these alphabet files means that the two HMMs they make will
never recognize each other. The HMM from the input data can only produce and
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(a)
Raw
time
data
(b) Histogram of the sending data
Figure 3.7: Time delays and histogram of the data going into Tor.
recognize strings of symbols like a,b,b,c,a,c,c,a, ect. By comparison, the HMM
of the output data would only ever display or recognize strings of symbols like
d,d,d,d,d,d,d, ect. Every now and then it may produce an e or f, but for the most
part it will be stuck in only 1 state.
Because of the noise generated by Tor, the two models generated from the
input and output data will not recognize each other. In addition, the model of
the output data is not unique enough to separate it from other output HMMs.
So not only can one not identify the individual the target is communicating with,
you can also not identify if the target is communicating to multiple individuals or
only one.
Data Value Symbol
0.3 a
0.6 b
0.9 c
Table 3.1: The alphabet file made from the input data histogram.
The net result of this is the same as Abbott’s. Once again the noise of the
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(a)
Raw
time
data
(b) Histogram of the output data
Figure 3.8: Time delays and histogram of the data coming from Tor.
Data Value Symbol
1 d
300 e
450 f
Table 3.2: The alphabet file made from the output data histogram.
global Tor network has overwhelmed the methods developed on the experimental
Tor network. As such, we must develop a different way of creating the alphabet
file. A way that will be able to read through the noise of Tor and still pick out
the data we need it to. The solution we found was to use a neural network.
3.2 Finding Data Clusters in Tor
In earlier work, it was discussed how neural networks can be an effective means
of identifying data clusters [2]. As such, it was decided to use a neural network to
identify data clusters in the timing delay data for packets leaving Tor.
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3.2.1 Reexamining the Side Channel Timing Attack
As mentioned earlier, the growing neural gas looks through the data and locates
clusters [8]. These clusters represents the parts of the data that we can identify
as important. We can then create an alphabet file using these cluster regions as
values. From there on, the method is the same as Craven’s original work.
So with that said, lets run through the experiment again. Figure 3.9 shows
examples of the input and output data for this test. The actual test consisted of
transmitting 320,000 packets and took 3 days to run. So for space efficiency, the
numbers seen are only the first few in the set.
(a)
Raw
input
data
(b)
Raw
output
data
Figure 3.9: Time delays going into and coming out of Tor.
Table 3.3 shows the alphabet file made using the GNG. As one can see, far
more data clusters were noticed by the GNG then by the histogram of this data.
In addition, several of the cluster values are very close to the values in the input
data. This means that we can use the same alphabet on both the output and the
input data. This makes it easier to compare the two HMMs. Figure 3.10 shows
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Data Value Symbol
0.1703 a
0.2882 b
0.4304 c
0.5715 d
0.6486 e
0.6741 f
0.6765 g
0.6769 h
0.6809 i
0.7218 j
0.8866 k
1.1325 l
Table 3.3: The alphabet file made from running the output data through the
GNG.
the HMM of the input and output data. As one can see, the HMM for the output
data is far more noisy then the input data.
(a) Hidden Markov Model of input data (b) Hidden Markov Model of output data
Figure 3.10: Hidden Markov Models of data.
Now comes the time to test the data. In order to do so, we generate strings of
symbols from each of the HMMs and try to pass that data into the other. We then
record the acceptance rate of of each one. As seen in table 3.4, the acceptance
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rates of the HMM are surprisingly low. This does actually make sense though.
Going back to the blender analogy, since we are only making the model out of the
pieces we can identify, it means we are ignoring and rejecting most of the data
produced. Thus, in the same way the HMMs reject most of the data it receives.
The one exception is the input HMM, since that data is free of the large volumes
of noise that plague the output data.
Input HMM Output HMM
String from input HMM 0.6 0.012
String from output HMM 0.0 0.08
Table 3.4: The maximum acceptance rate of the HMMs.
Despite the low acceptance rate, the data does confirm Craven’s attack on
Tor. Using the HMM of the output data, we are able to recognize both the user
communicating and the user receiving data. Now we test whether the HMMs can
differentiate themselves from other models. In order to do that, we create a second
model of data. The alphabet for this second HMM can be seen in table 3.5, and
the resulting HMMs from that data can be seen in figure 3.11. The test results
from comparing the output HMM from the first data set to the second set can be
seen in table 3.6.
As shown in table 3.6, both HMMs have very low acceptance rates of their
own data. Each one accepts roughly 10% of their own output, and only 1% of the
output from the HMM of their corresponding input data. However, both models
reject 100% of the other models data. As such, both models are able to recognize
themselves, as well as reject other models. Thus, Craven’s attack is able to be
successfully implemented by using neural networks.
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(a) Second HMM of
input data
(b) Second HMM of output data
Figure 3.11: Hidden Markov Models of second set of data.
3.2.2 Reexamining Multiple Paths through Tor
Now that we have found a way to successfully form Craven’s attack, we can revisit
Abbott’s work and test out how well multiple paths confuse and prevent Craven’s
attack method. In order to do this, we will redo the 1, 2, and 3 path tests. The
difference is that this time the time delay data will be sent through the GNG in
order to make the alphabet file for the CSSR program.
For all three tests, we will be using the input data from figure 3.9, however
the output data will vary for each test. Examples of the circuits that each HMM
represents can be seen in figure 3.12. In all three cases, the time delays for the
input data were collected right as they left user1. The time delays for the output
were all collected as the packets arrived at user2.
One of the first things noticed when testing the multiple paths was that the
attacker was doomed to fail if they were observing only one of the possible paths.
For example in figure3.12, assume the attacker is only watching the orange path.
Because he is only watching 1 path, he is only observing a third of the packets
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Data Value Symbol
0.0918 a
0.2143 b
0.2691 c
0.2691 d
0.2693 e
0.2830 f
0.3744 g
0.6251 h
1.0875 i
2.1431 j
4.2677 k
Table 3.5: The alphabet file made from running the output data through the GNG
for the second data set.
Output HMM1 Output HMM2
String from Input HMM1 0.012 0.0
String from Output HMM1 0.08 0.0
String from Input HMM2 0.0 0.01
String from Output HMM2 0.0 0.098
Table 3.6: The maximum acceptance rate of the HMMs of the output data.
coming out of Tor. As such, the inter-packet time delays he receives will be much
larger then those on the single path. They become so large that the values in the
alphabet files don’t overlap. This creates the same problem as discussed earlier
where it becomes impossible to compare the HMMs created.
Thus, in the following tests, all HMM’s use the same alphabet (that of figure
3.3), and all output data collected represents the packets right as they reach the
user. This means that the attacker is able to view all the packets being sent, not
just the ones traveling through one of the possible paths.
The results of this worst case test can be seen in table 3.7. As seen in the
table, using multiple paths for the packets causes the single path HMM to no
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(a) Example circuit for
HMM1
(b) Example circuit for
HMM2
(c) Example circuit for HMM3
Figure 3.12: Examples of the different circuits the HMMs represent.
longer recognize the output. However, all three paths are able to recognize the
input data at roughly the same rate. This means that in the worst case scenario,
the attacker would still be able to identify who is communicating to the user
regardless of the number of paths taken.
HMM1 HMM2 HMM3
String from HMM1 0.08 0.1 0.09
String from HMM2 0.0 0.13 0.097
String from HMM3 0.0 0.14 0.13
String from Input HMM 0.012 0.011 0.013
Table 3.7: The maximum acceptance rate of the HMMs in the multiple path test.
While Abbott’s defense is not successful in the worst case scenario on the
global Tor network, it does work well for all others. If the attacker is monitoring
traffic inside of Tor, and thus only able to get the data on one path, the defensive
strategy works fine. This strategy also works if the attacker has already built a
model of the data, since the single path model cannot recognize the data from the
multiple paths as similar to its own. The only way to overcome the worst case
scenario would be if the exit node was also transmitting dummy traffic along a
unused path to the user. This could possibly change the HMM enough so that the
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input data would no longer be recognized as part of the model.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
4.1 Summary
In this work we examined the differences between global and experimental Tor
networks, and the difficulties involved in extending research from the experimental
network to the global network.
We showed that rather then using histograms to identify clusters of data, the
global Tor network is best analyzed using a neural network. Using a neural net,
we were able to successfully launch a side channel timing attack on the global Tor
network. And while the results were not perfect, there is potential for them to be
improved upon.
We also showed that while using multiple paths through Tor will protect the
user from most side channel timing attacks, it will not protect them from the worst
case scenario. Yet even this has more room to be worked on and tested using the
global network.
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4.2 Recommendations for Further Research
There are several possible avenues for furthering the research presented here. The
most obvious is attempting to implement the use of multiple paths through Tor.
This could have serious performance issues that would need to be addressed when
considering the effect on the speed and capacity of the global network.
In addition to that, an alternate solution to the side channel attack could be
developed that is capable of handling the worst case scenario presented earlier.
One could then attempt to compare its effectiveness and network efficiency before
implementing on the global network.
There is also the possibility that more anonymous networks then Tor are vul-
nerable to the timing attack, and thus research could be done to test other net-
works, and attempt to propose solutions to those that are vulnerable.
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